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John D. Grahamt
Federal agencies are required by presidential executive order to
prepare a regulatory impact assessment (RIA) in support of any eco-
nomically significant regulatory action.' An important feature of the
RIA is a benefit-cost analysis.2 Although benefit-cost considerations
are not always decisive in regulatory decisionmaking, they are gradu-
ally becoming more important both in the United States and abroad
If the benefits and costs of a rule are projected to occur at differ-
ent points in time, which is common, a discount rate is generally ap-
plied to future benefits or costs in order to convert them to present
value. Until 2003, the position of the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) was that such analyses should generally employ a real
(that is, inflation-adjusted) discount rate of 7 percent.'
OMB Circular A-4, published September 17, 2003, revisited this
question.! Circular A-4 was developed through a multi-year process
that included a collaboration of analysts at OMB and the Council of
Economic Advisors, public comment, expert peer review, and formal
interagency review. The result of that process was a refined OMB po-
sition on time-preference issues.
t Dean, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, California.
I Exec Order 12866,3 CFR 638 (1993) reprinted in 5 USC § 601 note (2000) (outlining the
assessments of regulatory alternatives, anticipated costs, and benefits associated with proposed
regulations that agencies should conduct).
2 A classic treatment of cost-benefit analysis is EJ. Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An
Informal Introduction (Routledge 4th ed 1994).
3 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Protection ix
(ABA 2002) (recognizing that cost-benefit analysis has become predominant in agency deci-
sionmaking processes, and questioning how such analysis evaluates risk and future generations);
Jonathan B. Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe 2-3, online at http://eprints.law.duke.edu/
archive/00001586/01/_Curr.Leg.Probs...pdf (visited Jan 22,2007), 59 Current Legal Probs (forth-
coming 2007) (noting that European institutions are increasingly using cost-benefit analysis). See
generally Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Regulatory
Impact Analysis (RIA) Inventory (Apr 15, 2004), online at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd22/9/35258430.pdf (visited Jan 22, 2007) (detailing the cost-benefit analysis programs
established in OECD countries).
4 See Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs 8 (1992), available at 57 Fed Reg 53519, 53523 (1992)
(providing 7 percent as the discount rate based on past pre-tax rates of return).
5 See Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis 31-37 (2003),
online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/aOO4/a-4.pdf (visited Jan 22,2007).
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I. INTRAGENERATIONAL DISCOUNTING
For benefits and costs that accrue within a generation, A-4 rec-
ommends that agency analysts present two sets of benefit-cost calcula-
tions: one using the traditional rate of 7 percent; another using a lower
rate of 3 percent.6 A-4 stipulates that the same rate must be applied to
benefits and costs in order to avoid well-documented perversities.7
The two rates are based on different economic concepts: foregone
investment and foregone consumption. In a theoretically perfect
economy -one that is risk free, tax free, with all commodities perfectly
divisible-one might expect the consumption rate of interest to equal
the marginal rate of return on private investment. Since the real world
of capital markets and consumer decisionmaking is complex, analysts
are confronted with an array of interest rates (short run, long run, low
risk, high risk, pre-tax, post-tax) to choose from.!
The 7 percent rate is intended to represent the long-term oppor-
tunity cost of capital in the U.S. economy, measured as the average
rate of return on private investment (for example, average pre-tax
returns on investment). Thus, if a regulatory cost displaces capital in-
vestment, the analyst needs to compute what the returns on the dis-
placed investment would have been, assuming the investment had not
been displaced.
The 3 percent rate is intended to represent the average con-
sumer's rate of time preference, measured as the after-tax returns on
savings accounts. If the cost of a regulation is imposed as a higher
price on products purchased by consumers, then the consumer faces
the dilemma of paying that cost through either foregone consumption
or diminished savings (or greater debt).
When a specific regulation is being analyzed, it may be difficult
for the analyst to determine whether the costs (or savings) will be ex-
pressed in the economy as a change in investment or a change in con-
sumption, or both. If the rule will impact both investment and con-
sumption, it may be difficult to discern the relative proportions. Con-
sequently, OMB takes the position that the analyst should bound the
two possibilities by presenting one set of benefit-cost results using 3
percent and another using 7 percent.
6 Id at 33.
7 Id at 34. See also Emmett B. Keeler and Shan Cretin, Discounting of Life-Saving and
Other Nonmonetary Effects, 29 Mgmt Sci 300, 305 (1983) (arguing that the use of a lower dis-
count rate for benefits than for costs leads to "peculiar, even absurd, consequences").
8 See J. Lipscomb, M.C. Weinstein, and G.W. Torrance, Time Preference, in Marthe R.
Gold, et al, eds, Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine 214, 216-19 (Oxford 1996) (recogniz-
ing that the imperfections of the real world prevent a clear-cut discounting analysis from being
easily implemented).
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In A-4, OMB also acknowledges that agency analysts may dis-
cover, in the context of specific rulemaking, that a rate other than 3
percent or 7 percent may be appropriate to analyze. For example, A-4
expresses particular concern about rules that might cause capital to be
reallocated away from the corporate sector of the economy, where
average (pre-tax) real returns were 10 percent in the 1990s, "returning
to the same level observed in the 1950s and 1960s."9 A-4 provides the
agency analyst the technical discretion to present benefit-cost results
based on other rates, in addition to 3 percent and 7 percent.
II. INTERGENERATIONAL DISCOUNTING
For the first time, OMB in A-4 addressed specifically the question
of how benefits or costs in one generation should be compared to
benefits or costs incurred in another generation."' Previously, OMB
had assumed implicitly that the same rate of discount, presumably 7
percent, should be applied in both the intragenerational and intergen-
erational contexts.
Though not stated explicitly, OMB appears to be acknowledging
that the results of a regulatory analysis could be highly sensitive to
whether a discount rate of 3 percent, 2.8 percent, or 2.5 percent is em-
ployed. This sensitivity is particularly likely when either a large cost or
a large benefit is projected to occur more than a generation from now.
In addition, OMB was aware of some technical arguments-still con-
troversial- suggesting that smaller discount rates are likely to be ap-
propriate for problems with very long time horizons (though such ar-
guments do not necessarily correspond neatly with generations)." For
example, there is some psychological and survey evidence that dis-
count rates decline as the time horizon expands into the future."2 When
surveyed, economists themselves tend to supply lower discount rates
for impacts in the "distant future" compared to those in the next cou-
9 OMB, Circular A-4 at 34 (cited in note 5).
10 Id at 35-36 (noting that future generations could still be treated fairly while applying a
discount rate).
11 See, for example, Martin L. Weitzman, "Just Keep Discounting, but...", in Paul R. Port-
ney and John P. Weyant, eds, Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 23, 29 (Resources for the
Future 1999) (arguing that uncertainty about future interest rates suggests that small discount
rates should be used for "deep-future projects").
12 See, for example, Maureen L. Cropper, Sema K. Aydede, and Paul R. Portney, Prefer-
ences for Life Saving Programs: How the Public Discounts Time and Age, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty
243, 251-55 (1994) (describing empirical research suggesting that the discount rates individuals
apply are inversely related to time delay); Charles M. Harvey, The Reasonableness of Non-
Constant Discounting, 53 J Pub Econ 31, 35-36 (1994); John K. Horowitz, Discounting Money
Payoffs: An Experimental Analysis, in Stanley Kaish and Benjamin Gilad, eds, Handbook of
Behavioral Economics: Behavioral Decision Making 309, 316 (JAI 1991); Richard Thaler, Some
Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 Econ Letters 201,205 (1981).
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pie of years. For example, Geoffrey Heal argues that there is certainly
no economic consensus concluding that impacts one hundred years
from now should be discounted at the same annual rate as impacts
five years from now."
For intergenerational contexts, OMB again instructs agencies to
present results using 3 percent and 7 percent, coupled with an explicit
discussion of the ethical or distributional ramifications of the inter-
generational impacts. However, A-4 goes further and acknowledges
the possibility that it may also be informative to present results using
a nonzero rate of discount that is less than 3 percent.4
III. GENERAL VERSUS PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSES
Professor Heal reminds us that the utility discount rate is distinct
from the consumption discount rate, the latter being a function of the
former. For analysts, he explains that the utility discount rate-which
might be presumed to be zero -is a general equilibrium concept, used
in models of the evolution of an entire economy over time. If the ana-
lyst is instead evaluating a small project with no economy-wide impli-
cations, then the analysis is a partial equilibrium exercise and the con-
sumption rate of discount (possibly the 3 percent rate suggested by
OMB) is appropriate. He describes the climate change issue as one
that might require a general equilibrium model.
For practical U.S. regulatory analysis, a partial equilibrium analy-
sis will almost always be the appropriate course. That is because (a)
the U.S. economy is only one part of a huge and growing world econ-
omy, and (b) a single regulation is rarely expected to have a discerni-
ble impact on the overall growth path of the U.S. economy. Even in
the case of policies to address global climate change, we should not
assume that general equilibrium approaches to analysis will be re-
quired. The U.S. economy, for example, is far less sensitive to changes
in energy prices than it was thirty or fifty years ago. Moreover, climate
13 See Martin L. Weitzman, Gamma Discounting, 91 Am Econ Rev 260, 266-69 (2001)
(describing and analyzing a survey of 2,160 economists showing that the vast majority would use
lower discount rates for long-term projects than for short-term projects); Geoffrey Heal, In-
tertemporal Welfare Economics and the Environment, in Karl-Goran Maler and Jeffrey R. Vin-
cent, eds, 3 The Handbook of Environmental Economics: Economywide and International Envi-
ronmental Issues 1106, 1140 (Elsevier 2005) (citing Weitzman's survey of economists as evidence
that economists are aware of the issues raised by long-term discounting).
14 OMB, Circular A-4 at 35-36 (cited in note 5) (allowing use of a lower discount rate in
the intergenerational context because of ethical considerations about the equal treatment of
future generations).
15 Heal, Intertemporal Welfare Economics at 1139 (cited in note 13) (noting that the gen-
eral equilibrium model is best used on policies that will impact an entire region or economy). See
also Geoffrey Heal, Discounting:A Review of Basic Economics, 74 U Chi L Rev 59,67 (2007).
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change policies that have a significant impact on the overall U.S.
economy are not likely to be politically feasible."
IV. A COMMENT ON WELFARISM
In the conference discussion, some participants envisioned a fu-
ture for regulatory analysis where economic measures of benefit and
cost-those based on classical concepts of willingness to pay money
(for benefit) and willingness to accept money (as compensation for
cost)-might be replaced by direct measures of changes in utility or
happiness as a result of new policies. This revival of pure utilitarian
thinking would surely have made Jeremy Bentham proud."
The philosophical attraction to this idea is that economic measures
are more influenced by the distribution of wealth and income in society
than are utility and happiness. For example, measuring gains in health
policy based on changes in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) is gain-
ing intellectual ground as compared to monetary measures, in part be-
cause the determination of QALYs is not heavily influenced by the
wealth or income of the beneficiaries (whereas willingness to pay for
personal health gains is obviously constrained by wealth and income).'8
In making decisions affecting health policy, we may be concerned with
more than our own personal health and the amounts that people get-
ting benefits from the government might be able to pay for such bene-
fits. Do we really want a government that values ten QALYs saved in a
poor community less than ten QALYs saved in a wealthy community?
In other words, a pure welfarist approach to regulatory analysis
based on utility or happiness may be less vulnerable to allegations of
unfairness based on underlying inequities in the distribution of eco-
16 A mandatory, economy-wide cap on greenhouse gas emissions was voted down twice on
the floor of the U.S. Senate, once in 2003, 108th Cong, 1st Sess, in 149 Cong Rec S 13598 (Oct 30,
2003), and again in 2005, Roll Call Vote No 148, 109th Cong, 1st Sess, in 151 Cong Rec S 7029
(Jun 22,2005). Concerns about adverse economic impacts were cited by opponents in both floor
debates. See, for example, 149 Cong Rec S 13495 (Oct 29, 2003) (Sen Voinovich) (arguing that
carbon dioxide caps will raise energy prices and cost jobs); 151 Cong Rec S 7002-03 (June 22,
2005) (Sen Bond) (arguing that mandatory carbon dioxide limits would cost the U.S. jobs). See
also Mike Mills, Futurist: Climate for Change, CQ Weekly 444 (Feb 21, 2005), online at
http://public.cq.com/public/20050221-futurist.html (visited on Jan 22, 2007) (arguing that al-
though the government is unlikely to mandate carbon dioxide limits soon, many businesses are
beginning to support such limits, especially at the federal level so as to preempt state schemes);
Mary Clare Jalonick, Ominous Forecast Predicted for Greenhouse Emissions Bill in Upcoming
Senate Debate, CQ Weekly 2645 (Oct 25,2003) (observing that the sponsors of the bill knew they
do not have the votes to win).
17 See Ted Honderich, ed, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 85-88 (Oxford 1995)
(describing Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism).
18 See Peter J. Neumann, Using Cost-Effectiveness Analysis to Improve Health Care: Op-
portunities and Barriers 8-10 (Oxford 2005).
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nomic goods. Across generations, one might also be able to assume
that a unit of happiness (or a QALY) in one generation is equivalent
to a unit of happiness (or a QALY) in a future generation, without
having to address the willingness to pay of the present versus the fu-
ture generation.
As attractive as the welfarist revival may be, it may be useful to
remind readers why Kaldor-Hicks (economic) approaches to regula-
tory analysis became the practical norm in the first place, instead of
the various social welfare constructs that have been proposed and
discussed over the years. There was the rejection of cardinal utility, the
apparent logical impossibility of the sort of social functions that are
attractive to welfarists, and the practical reality that costs of policies
are readily determined in monetary units, without any obvious way to
convert them into utility or happiness.
First, a social utility function would presumably be based on some
aggregation of cardinal utilities for each person in the society. Yet
modern economics, after careful consideration, rejected the measur-
ability and interpersonal comparability of utility (or related concepts
of happiness). 9 Progress in psychology and neuroscience may cause
economics to reconsider its rejection of cardinal utility but, for now,
we do not have an objective measure of zero utility or a unit meas-
urement of utility (like we have for distance or weight), and thus the
utility scales for different individuals need have no connection with
one another.
Second, the logical impossibility of a social welfare function that
satisfies fairly innocuous assumptions is another serious concern.
Kenneth Arrow's famous work sought to define a social welfare func-
tion that satisfied a few basic, ethical axioms: unanimity (if one per-
son's preference is unopposed by all others in society, that preference
should be respected by the function); nondictatorship (no individual
has an ability to have his preferences dominate others in the function);
transitivity (if Policy A is better than Policy B, and B is better than C,
then A is better than C); and more complex yet plausible axioms such
as unrestricted domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
What Arrow found, sobering as the result may be, is that no social wel-
fare function satisfies these basic axioms.'
19 For example, see the textbook discussion in James P Quirk, Intermediate Microeconom-
ics 75 (Science Research 1976) (explaining that individual preferences do not provide a bench-
mark for interpersonal comparisons because of the lack of a means of measuring differences
between individuals).
20 For a lucid discussion of Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, see Dennis C. Muel-
ler, Public Choice 185-201 (Cambridge 1979) (establishing that the collective-choice process fails
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Finally, there is the practical reality that analysts measure the
costs of policies using data from markets where prices are determined
based on a particular distribution of income and wealth. If the metric
for analysis will be utility instead of money, we will need to learn how
to transform monetary costs into diminished utility and happiness, a
significant new analytical challenge. Moreover, if we want the cost
measure to be based on a "just" wealth distribution, the challenge be-
comes even more difficult. It is far from straightforward to determine
what the costs of Policy A would be under Wealth Distribution 1 ver-
sus Wealth Distribution 2, since different wealth distributions may
generate different prices in the economy. It is, of course, the prices of
resources (for example, labor and capital) that are combined with in-
put quantities to determine the costs of a policy.
Some of these problems can be averted if we back away from an
ambitious benefit-cost position and settle for a comparison of policies
based on cost-effectiveness. Health policy is moving in this direction,
leaving to accountable politicians the value judgment about how much
it is worth to save a QALY. Some have charted ways for regulatory
analysis to move in that direction as well." In A-4, OMB instructs
agencies to present both benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness results.
to satisfy certain basic criterion, such as allowing unopposed preferences and ensuring nondicta-
torship of one individual over the rest).
21 See generally Wilhelmine Miller, Lisa A. Robinson, and Robert S. Lawrence, eds, Valuing
Health for Regulatory Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (National Academies 2006) (exploring the use
of cost-effectiveness analyses for "economically significant health and safety regulations").
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